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THE BACKGROUND OF ERIE
EuGENE N. ZiGLER*
Facing, as I do, this audience of learned judges, advocates, and
scholars, all of whom know more about the subject of my address
than I, and feeling ill prepared for the task before me, I am
reminded of a scene from Oscar Wilde's play The Importance
of Being Earnest. You will recall that Mr. John Worthing, a
foundling who could only trace his ancestry back to a suitcase
in Victoria Station, has had the temerity to ask that veritable
dragon of Victorian snobbery, Lady Bracknell, for her daugh-
ter's hand in marriage, to which she replies, "I have always been
of the opinion that a man who desires to get married should
know either everything or nothing. Which do you know?" Mr.
Worthing answers after some hesitation, "I know nothing, Lady
Bracknell." "I am pleased to hear it," Lady Bracknell replies, "I
do not approve of anything that tampers with natural ignorance.
Ignorance is like a delicate exotic fruit; touch it and the bloom
is gone.-Fortunately in England at any rate, education pro-
duces no effect whatsoever."
Anyone who has the temerity to address this audience on Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins1 should know either everything or nothing.
Like Mr. Worthing, I plead to knowing nothing and only hope
that the preparation I have made has not destroyed the natural
bloom of ignorance.
I am reassured by the thought that my function on this panel
is to serve as prologue-to set the stage for the real show which
follows. Indeed, if I may paraphrase one of Shakespeare's fa-
mous prologues,2 I long "for a muse of fire, that would ascend
the highest heaven of invention--for within the small span of
twenty minutes I must conjure up in your imagination the very
constitutional debate which more than once shook the founda-
tions of this nation, and with the aid of your imaginary forces
delineate those "two high upreared and abutting fronts," Bwift
v. Tyson3 and Eoie v. Tompkins.
The decision in Erie v. Tompkins written by Mr. Justice Bran-
deis begins with startling abruptness. "The question for decision
* McEachin, Townsend & Zeigler, Florence, South Carolina.
1. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY THE FinLH (prologue).
3. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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is whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall
now be disapproved"--a question he emphatically answered in
the affirmative. Then comes what must have been a real shocker
to the litigants back in 1938. "If only a question of statutory
construction were involved, we should not be prepared to aban-
don a doctrine so widely applied through nearly a century. But
the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made
clear, and compels us to do so. Except in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law
of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal con-
cern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in
the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the fed-
eral courts."4
Taking our cue from the opinion itself, let us consider the
background of Erie in the framework of three topics: The dele-
gation of powers, the separation of powers, and the nature of
common law in our federal system. Let us begin with a consid-
eration of the question of separation of powers and its history
as a constitutional issue.
From a strong sentiment of national unity which prevailed
during the early part of the Revolutionary War, through a spirit
of particularism which led to the Articles of Confederation of
1781, down through the reaction toward national unity which
lead to the ratification of the Constitution in 1788, the political
thought of the time associated liberty with self government and
feared centralization as tending toward tyranny. The Constitu-
tion and the theories that were put forward in its support did
not clearly define the nature of the new American state. Ultimate
authority was believed to reside in the people, but whether of
the states separately or of the states collectively was not an-
swered. It was a "compound republic" with sovereignty divided
between the states and the union. The term "sovereignty" was
carefully omitted from the Constitution, and the real issue was
deliberately avoided.5
4. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
5. GmrLL, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 415 (1925).
1965]
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Initially the founding fathers probably thought that the states
would retain most legislative authority and the Congress of the
United States would be exercising limited legislative power in
rather severely restricted subject matter areas.
Iistory has not supported their view and we have witnessed
the rapid expansion of federal powers particularly in the area
of war power and commerce power. To this might be added the
indicated expansion in the Clearfield Thustu type situation and
in the Lincoln Mills7 type situation.
There are limits within the federal system which have been
referred to as delegation of powers. Listed in the first seventeen
clauses of article I, section 8 of the Constitution are certain
specific powers of the legislative branch and in clause eighteen
the "necessary and proper clause." This eighteenth clause grants
to the Congress power "to make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."
Two rival theories arose to explain the nature of the federal
system: The theory of states rights, a particularist theory, em-
phasizing the sovereignty retained by the states; and the nation-
alistic or organic theory with emphasis on the idea of a single,
sovereign, national state. The central issue of American political
and legal thought, and the one around which the greatest consti-
tutional controversies have been waged, concerns the relations
between the state and national governments and the distribution
of powers between the two in a federal system. A large part of
the work of the Supreme Court of the United States has been
devoted to the demarcation of the line between federal and state
functions.8 Osholm v. Georgia,9 (decided in 1793), the first
6. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The Court
in this case held that it would be inappropriate to have the rights and duties
of the United States on commercial paper issued by it controlled by state rather
than federal law. "It would lead to great diversity in results by making identical
transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The de-
sirability of a uniform rule is plain." Id. at 367.
7. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In a divided
opinion the Court held that where § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (Taft-Hartley Act) granted jurisdiction of suits for violation of labor-
management contracts, then the federal courts should bring into being a federal
common law governing these contracts.
8. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOvERNMENT
AND POLITICS, 1789-1835 (1960).
9. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
[Vol. 17
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case of importance to come before the Supreme Court, raised this
issue; and, affirming the idea of divided sovereignty, the Court
stated that "the United States are sovereign as to all the powers
of government actually surrendered. Each state in the union is
sovereign as to all the power reserved."' 0 This was a difficult
line to hold.
When slavery became a national issue and intensified the con-
flict between nationalism and particularism, the compromise
theory of divided sovereignty was replaced by rigid dogmas of
state sovereignty on the one hand and national supremacy on
the other."'
By the mid-nineteenth century nationalism was becoming the
wave of the future. One of its most articulate spokesmen was
Mr. Justice Story who had championed this doctrine in his com-
mentaries on the Constitution published in 1833. It was fairly
predictable that his decisions should be toward the augmentation
of national federal power. In 1842, Swift v. Tyson carried the
courts forward on this rising tide of nationalism.
The issue involved in Swift was whether a pre-existing debt
constituted valid consideration for an endorsement of a bill of
exchange. The defendant contended that such a debt was not re-
garded as valid consideration by the law of New York. The
United States Supreme Court had, in several decisions, held that
this was good consideration so that the endorsee would be a
holder in due course. The decisions of the New York courts were
not clear, and Mr. Justice Story decided that even if New York
decisions had supported the defendant's position, the United
States Supreme Court would not be bound to accept them as con-
clusive. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, commonly called
the Rules of Decision Act, provided that "the laws of the several
States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States where they apply." Story held that this
section did not require federal courts to determine questions of
commercial law by reference to the decisions of state courts since
the law involved was not "of a single country only, but of the
commercial world.'
1 2
10. Id. at 435.
11. GETTELL, op. cit. mipra note 5, at 416.
12. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
1965]
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The foundation of Justice Story's decision was his understand-
ing of what he considered to be the normal meaning of the word
"laws," and certain policy considerations which the Court re-
garded as important.13 In connection with what the word "laws"
means, he stated, "In the ordinary use of language it will hardly
be contended that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They
are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not
themselves laws."14 Following his statement as to the nature of
laws, he distinguishes between two types of laws: local laws and
general laws. Under the heading of local laws he included state
statutes and constructions of state statutes, and decisions as to
real estate and other immovables. This he contrasts with "gen-
eral law" such as general commercial law, dependent not on "the
decisions of the local tribunals, but on the general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."' 5 His quotation of
Cicero's remark that commercial law cannot be one thing in
Rome and another in Athens has been cited as evidence that
Justice Story was seeking through this decision to advance his
idea of uniformity of law.'
The implications of Swift were manifold. First, it assumed a
theory that common law existed independently of states or na-
tions and the judges merely discovered the law and applied it.
This was the higher-law concept of the common law decisional
process. If we consider federal common laws as formulated in
at least two ways, Story was referring to what is known as pure
common law, the law made by judges without statutory guid-
ance. The other, which has been given the fancy name "inter-
stitial" law, or the "filling-in-the-gaps" type, is common law
made when a court, called upon to construe a statute, fills in the
gaps which inevitably legislators leave. Some might call this
simply statutory construction, but it is generally included in
discussions of the federal common law.' 7 It should be noted that
the latter type of interstitial common law is possible for the
courts only when necessary and proper under a validly exercised
power of Congress.
13. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 188 (1963).
14. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). Currency was given
during the life of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson that Mr. Justice Story's inter-
pretation of "laws" derived from Blackstone's statement "that the decisions of
courts of justice are the evidence of what is common law." Teton, The Story
of Swift v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REv. 519, 520 (1941).
15. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842).
16. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 188.
17. The Future of a Federal Common Law, 17 ALA. L. REv. 10, 17 (1964).
[Vol. 17
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The second was that state courts are somehow inferior to fed-
eral courts, and that citizens engaged in business activities which
cross state lines need the protection of a better type judicial
system and a higher type law. This they might have through
diversity suits in which general federal law would be appli-
cable.' 8
The third was that uniformity of the law was desirable, that
unity rather than diversity was an essential part of nationalism,
and that it could best be achieved through the federal judicial
system.
19
A sense of delicacy dictates that no more than a passing ref-
erence be made to the resolution of the differences between the
nationalist movement and the states right movement. The main
question of constitutional construction underlying the debate
gave rise to a conflict incapable of rational solution. Suffice it
to say that some one hundred years ago there was an unpleasant-
ness between the sections of this country, and in the test of arms
that ensued, the theory of state sovereignty was pretty well
destroyed. It survives as a mere device within the American fed-
eral system, and the conflicts which plague state and federal
courts today are mostly concerned with housekeeping within
that system.20
A high watermark in the expansion of nationalism and of
the Swift doctrine is found in the case of Gelpoke v. City of
Dubuque,21 decided in 1863, when the Court declared: "We shall
never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a state tri-
bunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice."
22
Like most movements in history, however, no sooner was the
doctrine of ,Swift v. Tyson beginning to expand than difficulties
18. Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts,
The American Law Institute, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Commentary on
General Diversity Jurisdiction, p.50.
19. Teton, supra note 14, at 523.
20. In this view, shared by other thoughtful observers, it is futile to engage
in controversy over the expansion of federal, or "central" power at the
expense of the states or, even worse, to put the question in terms of "state's
rights." For persons in government, intent on solving specific and pressing
problems, the question of federal-state relations cannot be discussed, let
alone resolved, in terms of abstract systems of power. Within the limits of
our constitutional framework, the question of federal-state relations has
become essentially one of method, and the methods of co-operation-or of
drawing lines-between levels of government are a pragmatic business,
responding to changing needs and pressures.
Grad, Federal-State Compact, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 825, 830 (1963).
21. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
22. Id. at 206-207.
1965]
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in its application became apparent. The triumph of nationalism
in this country and in Europe was paralleled by a growing
worldwide tendency to examine the social, economic, and politi-
cal forces that make up the life of a state rather than theories of
sovereignty.2 3 It is a pity that Mr. Justice Story could not have
had the advantage of the wisdom of John Chipman Gray's
remark that, "Dirt is only matter out of place; and what is a blot
on the escutcheon of the Common Law may be a jewel in the
crown of the Social Republic."
24
Had the decision in Swiftv . Tyson been limited to questions
of commercial law, all might have been well. But in dealing with
the doctrine, the courts were like the small boy who protested
that he knew how to spell the word banana, but he just didn't
know where to stop. The decision was not limited to commercial
law, and ultimately it was held that federal courts were to de-
cide on their own, as a matter of federal common law, questions
of the law of torts.25 As a rule state law of real property was
followed, but if the federal courts regarded the law as unsettled,
they felt that they could properly take their own view of the
law. 20 It was generally held that state court decisions construing
a state statute or constitution were to be followed in federal
courts, but where they conflicted with an earlier federal con-
struction of the statute or constitution, or where the state deci-
sion came down after the case had been tried in a lower federal
court, federal courts were not bound to follow them.2 7
The division of laws into categories denominated "general,"
which the federal courts were free to find for themselves, and
"local," in which state decisions were binding, proved highly
unsatisfactory. Predictability of the outcome of any case was
beclouded by the near impossibility of distinguishing in advance
of trial what the courts would regard as general law and what
23. GETrELL, op. cit. supra note 5, at 418. See also Woodrow Wilson's remark
that, "The question of the relation of the States to the federal government is the
cardinal question of our constitutional system. ... It cannot ... be settled by
the opinion of any one generation, because it is a question of growth, and every
successive stage of our political and economic development gives it a new aspect,
makes it a new question." WILsoN, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 173 (1908).
24. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (preface) (2d ed. 1895).
25. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 188, citing Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
26. WIUGHT, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 188, citing Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,
215 U.S. 349 (1910).
27. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 188, citing Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S.
(1 How.) 134 (1847); Burgess v. Slignian, 107 U.S. 20 (1883).
[Vol. 17
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they would regard as local law. The body of the federal general
law was so meager that prediction at the planning stage was
almost impossible. A lawyer could not tell whether the issue
would be litigated in a state court where the substantive control-
ling law would be state law or in a federal court where it might
be governed by general federal law.28
Even in the area where Mr. Justice Story was most sanguine,
the development of a uniform body of commercial law through
federal court decisions, the current of the times was against the
direction set by iSwift. By the end of the 1930's, it became impos-
sible for the United States Supreme Court or any single court
to maintain uniformity of commercial law by the force of ex-
ample. The nation's judicial business had grown beyond this
prospect, and although the New York Court of Appeals might
bow to the superior wisdom of the United States Supreme Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Story on a point of commercial
law, one could hardly expect similar deference to a decision of
three judges of an intermediate federal court of appeals.29
The trend toward making law by statute struck another blow
against the uniformity through decisional process promised in
Swift. In accordance with the clear command of the Rules of
Decision Act, Story had excepted from the "general" law which
federal courts were free to determine, "the positive statutes of
the state, and the construction thereof by local tribunals."3 0 The
Negotiable Instruments Law and other uniform statutes declara-
tory of the common law were held to be excepted from the Swift
doctrine, and Story's ideal was thereby frustrated in the very
area in which it was designed to operate.81
The adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
and the flood of federal legislation beginning with Theodore
Roosevelt increased the review of state action and required the
Supreme Court to devote the bulk of its time to constitutional
law and the interpretation of federal statutes. Judge Augustus
Hand noted in 1930 that "relatively few cases where rights under
the Federal Constitution and statutes are not involved are likely
to get beyond the Circuit Court of Appeals" and therefore "there
is much less chance than formerly of securing or even promoting
28. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 406 (1964).
29. Id. at 405-06.
30. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
31. Friendly, supra note 28, at 405-06.
1965]
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uniformity through the decisions of the Supreme Court" on
issues of "general" law.
32
By 1893 the doctrine of Swift . Tyson had come under heavy
attack. Mr. Justice Field in a dissenting opinion in Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. v. BaugA33 stated that he had "an abiding faith that
this, like other errors, will, in the end 'die among its worship-
ers. "1134 The next generation of jurists were prepared to state
that judges do not find the law, they make it. To Mr. Justice
Holmes common law was not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky, but the articulate voice of some identifiable sovereign.8 5
The aid of historical research was sought in the attack on
Swift. In 1923, Professor Charles Warren wrote that he had
discovered evidence that the original draft of the Rules of De-
cision Act read that "the Statute laws of the several states in
force for the time being and their unwritten or common law now
in use, whether by adoption from the common law of England,
the ancient statutes of the same or otherwise," should be rules
of decision in federal court. The statutory phrase "laws of the
several states" Professor Warren deduced was merely an abbre-
viated statement of the original draft and was intended as an
expression of the same idea, therefore, decisions of state courts
were intended to be included.
86
The most unfortunate result of the Swift case was that the ac-
cidental circumstance of the citizenship of one of the parties at
the time of suit determined the rule of law applicable in a par-
ticular litigation, resulting often in a determination which clear-
ly contradicted the law of the forum state.8 7 Thus, upon the
constant exacerbation of the nationalism versus states rights con-
flict, which has always been a threat to friendly co-existence
within the United States, was superimposed the additional irri-
32. Ibid.
33. 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
34. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 403 (1893).
35. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917). In the growing
criticisms of Swift v. Tyson, even the personality of Justice Story came under
attack. Factors of this nature bearing on the decision are suggested by Gray
to be Story's character and seniority, reputation of great learning, preoccupa-
tion in writing a book on bills of exchange, and restless vanity. GRAY, NATURE
AND SOURCES OF LAW 253 (2d ed. 1921). Even Brandeis comes in for his own
share of criticism in the Erie case when so open an admirer as judge Wyzanski
points out that the Erie case is "one conspicuous exception" to Brandeis' record
of strict avoidance of unnecessary constitutional issues. WYZANSXI, WHERxAS-
A JUDGE'S PmIs s 57 (1965).
36. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HA v. L. Rlv. 49, 84-88 (1924).
37. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 191.
[Vol. 17t
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tant of patently inequitable results. It was from the absurd
results of forum shopping in diversity cases that the most telling
argument against the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson came. Conspic-
uous among these was the decision in 1928 in the case of Black &
'White Taxi Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi 00.38 where a Kentucky
taxicab company, in order to avoid law which had been settled
in Kentucky for thirty-five years against enforcement of a con-
tract for the exclusive right to provide taxi service at a particu-
lar station, reincorporated itself in Tennessee. The Kentucky
corporation was dissolved and the contract assigned to the new
Tennessee corporation. Suit was then brought against the com-
petitor taxi company in federal court on the basis of diversity
of citizenship. The injunction granted against the second taxi
company was upheld by the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that the question presented was one of general law, that
the common law permitted exclusive contracts of this nature,
and that the Kentucky decisions preventing enforcement of the
contract were not binding in federal court.
The culmination of the discontent with Swift v. Tyson came in
the very surprising decision rendered by the Supreme Court in
1938 which is the subject of our discussion this afternoon. One
Harry Tompkins was walking along the right-of-way of the Erie
Railroad at Hughestown, Pennsylvania, when he was struck by
something which appeared to be a door projecting from one of
the moving cars of a passing train. By one view of Pennsylvania
law, Tompkins would have been regarded as a trespasser, and
therefore, the railroad would not be liable except for wanton or
willful misconduct. Under the "general" law, recognized by the
federal courts under Swift v. Tyson, Tompkins had the status
of a licensee, and the railroad company would be liable for
simple negligence. Tompkins, a resident of Pennsylvania,
brought suit against the New York corporation in the federal
court at New York City. He was awarded a 30,000 dollar ver-
dict which was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari. The appellant railroad stated in its brief, "We do not
question the finality of the holding of this court in Swift v.
Tyson . . ." and argued only that the Pennsylvania doctrine as
to the duty owed those in Tompkins' position declared a Penn-
sylvania rule sufficiently "local" in nature to be controlling.9
38. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
39. WRIGHT, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 191.
1965]
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The case was decided on constitutional grounds which had
never been raised either in the briefs or in argument. Four of
the other justices agreed with Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr.
Justice Reed concurred in part. Although he disapproved of the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, he would have avoided the consti-
tutional issue by merely holding that "the laws" referred to in
the Rules of Decision Act covered state decisions as well as state
statutes. The dissent of Justices Butler and McReynolds pointed
out that Mr. Justice Fields, after his one famous outburst, had
acquiesced in the doctrine, and that Mr. Justice Holmes, al-
though dissenting in the Black and White Taxi case, only stated
that while he would not extend the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
into new fields, he would not advocate overturning it.
40
Much critical reaction followed the new Erie doctrine. The
court was accused of having engaged in a plan whereby Swift
was "exhumed, convicted of Constitutional heresy, and its mold-
ering bones burned at the stake."41 Judge Clark speculated "how
the gentler touch of Cardozo might have left" the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson if the Erie decision had gone to him, as con-
trasted with Brandeis' failure "to realize that an ancient doc-
trine, already tending toward decay, did not need the sledge-
hammer blows he employed for its destruction.42 Mr. Justice
Stone, three years after he concurred in the decision, referred
to Mr. Justice Brandeis' constitutional arguments as "unfortu-
nate dicta.1
43
In the broad political history of the Court's work it was a
swing from nationalism back to particularism. Judge Friendly
considers in defense and praise of Ere that the Hegelian dia-
lectic has been at work here.44 (I make no apology for citing his
40. The dissenting Justices also with some sarcasm pointed out and protested
the fact that the Court was considering a constitutional question without giving
notice to the Attorney General and giving him an opportunity to participate.
This was a survival of the famous 1937 "court packing" bill. WRIGHT, op. Cit.
srupra note 13, at 192.
41. LLEwELLYN, THE COMmoN LAW TRADITIONs 417 (1960). Llewellyn points
out that Story's successors have now for a generation seemed disposed not only
to wipe out a ruling they found "unconstitutional" but to swing on into the
building of a worse one in its place. He states that the Swift rule is not even
yet clearly reversed, which made a single clear expression, by even "any jackleg
judge" of an inferior state court, control the federal court absolutely, control
without regard to the sense of the ruling or to its possible or probable reversal
or rejection above.
42. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 295-96 (1946).
43. WRInGT, op. cit. supra note 13, at 196.
44. Friendly, supra note 28, at 421.
[Vol. 17
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esoteric analogy, for at least one United States Senator from
South Carolina believes that an understanding of dialectical
materialism is a necessary part of the training of every red-
blooded recruit in the United States Marines). If Swiftv . Tyson
is the thesis, Erie, the antithesis, then Judge Friendly sees a
new specialized federal common law as the resultant synthesis.
When the dust had settled, however, Tompkins was out of
30,000 dollars, and new devils began to inhabit the federal courts
swept clean by Mr. Justice Brandeis with the Erie broom. Let
me leave you with three:
Since Erie, the federal courts have seemed to be advised by
the Supreme Court to determine whether on a given issue state
law may be inappropriate as a rationale, and in such instances
to follow federal common law. The problem is, when is state law
particularly appropriate, and what issues are particularly inap-
propriate for resolution by state common law?
The second, what is the limit of constitutional authority in
differentiating substance from procedure?
Last of all, is the specialized federal common law, which Judge
Friendly suggests as the healthy off-shoot of Erie, merely an-
other step toward the preemption of vast areas of law by the fed-
eral courts further accelerating the decline of a federal system? 45
Is it indicative of another swing from particularism to nation-
alism?
Dean John G. Hervey, of the Oklahoma City University Law
School, in predicting the eventual expansion of federal common
law to include both contract and tort law applicable in diversity
suits, states that he bases his prediction on the lecture given by
the head devil in hell at the graduation banquet honoring the
younger devils who were finishing their course and going to
earth to start their work.4 6 This is recorded in the addendum
to the second edition of the Screwtape Letters by C. S. Lewis,
wherein the head devil says to the lesser devils: "Now you're
going to find your work on earth far easier than I found it when
I graduated because they have on earth a number of great move-
ments, among which are unity and togetherness."
45. Id. at 405.
46. Morgan, The Future of a Federal Common Law, 17 ALA. L. REv. 10, 42
(1964).
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